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美國參議院通過涉朝金融制裁法案：《布林克法案》要點(diǎn)解讀
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2019年6月28日，美國參議院通過了《2020年度國防授權(quán)法案》，其中包括一項(xiàng)修正案，即《2019年奧托·瓦姆比爾限制銀行涉及朝鮮法案》（Otto Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North Korea Act of 2019）（下稱"《BRINK法案》"或"《布林克法案》"），標(biāo)志著新一輪針對朝鮮的潛在制裁。值得中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)關(guān)注的是，醞釀中的《布林克法案》可能授予美國財政部新的工具，以懲罰與朝鮮有業(yè)務(wù)往來的外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)。
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On June 28, 2019, the United States Senate passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Included as an amendment was the Otto Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North Korea Act of 2019.[1] Known as the BRINK Act, the act represents a potential new round of sanctions on North Korea. Worryingly for Chinese financial institutions, the proposed BRINK Act would give the U.S. Department of the Treasury new tools to punish foreign financial institutions that do business with North Korea.
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來自民主黨和共和黨的《布林克法案》支持者均旗幟鮮明地表達(dá)了該法案的立法意圖。民主黨參議員克里斯·范霍倫(Chris Van Hollen)表示："[法案]將通過制裁與朝鮮有業(yè)務(wù)往來的任何金融和商業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)，以打擊朝鮮的非法金融網(wǎng)絡(luò)。"共和黨參議員帕特·圖米(Pat Toomey)則直言："美國將給中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)一個非常簡單的選擇：你可以與美國開展業(yè)務(wù)，或者與朝鮮開展業(yè)務(wù)，但兩者不能兼得。"盡管近期美朝之間關(guān)系緩和，圖米參議員依然聲稱，特朗普總統(tǒng)支持《布林克法案》，他目前"并未獲悉政府對此法案有任何抵觸"，并且他認(rèn)為政府會"樂見加強(qiáng)對朝鮮的約束。"
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The bipartisan sponsors of the amendment were blunt in the potential legislation’s purpose. Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen stated that "[i]t’s going to target North Korea’s illicit financial network by imposing mandatory sanctions on those businesses, banks, any enterprises that are doing business with North Korea." Republic Senator Pat Toomey added that "they would present Chinese banks with a very simple choice. You can do business in the United States, or you can do business with North Korea. But you can’t do business with both." And while there has recently been rapprochement between the United States and North Korea, Toomey insisted that the U.S. President Donald Trump supports the BRINK Act, that he was "not aware of any resistance from the administration," and that he thought the administration would "welcome tightening the screws on North Korea."[2]
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我們認(rèn)為，該法案通過美國眾議院，得到美國總統(tǒng)簽署，最終成為正式法律的可能性很高。首先，美國眾議院目前為民主黨人控制。盡管特朗普總統(tǒng)希望通過"金特會"，即美朝首腦會談解決朝鮮核危機(jī)，美國國會對于朝鮮總是有自身的立場。與總統(tǒng)來自同一黨派的共和黨人控制下的參議院都通過了該法案，很難想象與總統(tǒng)不同黨派的民主黨人控制下的眾議院會阻止法案通過。其次，該法案是《2020年度國防授權(quán)法案》的一部分。一般而言，美國國會都會通過該年度的國防授權(quán)法案，因?yàn)殛P(guān)系美國國家安全。因此，一旦某法案搭上了國防授權(quán)法案的順風(fēng)車，其通過的概率很高。最后，從過往立法經(jīng)驗(yàn)來看，美國總統(tǒng)一般不會拒絕簽署參眾兩院已經(jīng)通過的法案，尤其是國防授權(quán)法案。因此，即便《布林克法案》內(nèi)容依然可能有所調(diào)整，但成為正式法律的可能性很高。
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The bill has two more steps to become law: pass the U.S. House of Representatives and then be signed into law by the U.S. President. There is no certainty that the bill will officially become law, but the possibility is very high. Firstly, the House is controlled by the Democrats. Despite President Trump’s efforts to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis by the Trump-Kim summits, the U.S. Congress always has its own idea regarding North Korea. The current U.S. Senate is controlled by the Republicans, the same party with the President, and yet still, the Senate passed the bill. It is unlikely that the U.S. House controlled by the Democrats will block it. Second, the bill is part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Generally speaking, the U.S. Congress will pass each year’s National Defense Authorization Act because the U.S. national security is at stake. Therefore, if a bill is an amendment of that year’s National Defense Authorization Act, the likelihood of passing the Congress cannot be ignored. In the end, the question is whether President Trump will sign the bill into law. Again, it is unlikely for the President not to sign the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 when both the Senate and the House have passed it. Therefore, the bill is very likely to become law though its content may be subject to further adjustment.
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雖然《布林克法案》尚未通過眾議院，也尚未被總統(tǒng)簽署，整個立法過程可能長達(dá)數(shù)月，而且出臺前仍將被修改，但是從《布林克法案》的主要內(nèi)容來看，我們認(rèn)為，中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)應(yīng)當(dāng)提前采取防范措施。我們將在下文分析相關(guān)原因，并為可能因?yàn)榕c朝鮮有業(yè)務(wù)往來而遭受《布林克法案》制裁的中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供一些建議，供企業(yè)決策者參考。
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Although the amendment has yet to pass the United States House of Representatives or to be signed into law by President Trump, processes that could take months, and there is no guarantee that it will pass as it currently exists, the content of the proposed BRINK Act necessitates, in our view, pre-emptive action by Chinese financial institutions. We describe why below and follow up with some advice for Chinese financial institutions that may have exposure to North Korea business that would run afoul of proposed sanctions in the BRINK Act.
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《布林克法案》簡析
The BRINK Act
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醞釀中的《布林克法案》將修改《2016年強(qiáng)化朝鮮制裁和政策法案》（下稱"《制裁朝鮮法》"），同時規(guī)定一級制裁和二級制裁。二級制裁的范圍遠(yuǎn)比一級制裁的更為寬泛。一級制裁僅僅禁止制裁實(shí)施國個人和實(shí)體與制裁對象開展業(yè)務(wù)，而二級制裁則向非美國第三方施壓，以實(shí)施切斷該第三方與制裁實(shí)施國的特定聯(lián)系等懲罰為威脅，要求其停止與制裁對象開展業(yè)務(wù)。因此，《布林克法案》將瞄準(zhǔn)任何與朝鮮受制裁實(shí)體開展業(yè)務(wù)的非美國實(shí)體。美國財政部下屬機(jī)構(gòu)—海外資產(chǎn)控制辦公室(下稱"OFAC")負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管、執(zhí)行經(jīng)濟(jì)和貿(mào)易制裁。
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The proposed BRINK Act amends the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (the "North Korea Sanctions Act")[3] and implements a mix of primary and secondary sanctions. In this case, the BRINK Act would target non-U.S. entities doing business with sanctioned North Korean entities. Primary sanctions prohibit citizens and companies from the sanctioning country, the United States in this case, from engaging in business with the sanctioned country, North Korea. Secondary sanctions are much broader, prohibiting third parties located outside of the sanctioning country, such as Chinese financial institutions, from conducting business with the sanctioned country. Secondary sanctions put pressure on third parties to halt business with the sanctioned country by creating penalties for sanction violations, such as cutting-off the third party’s access to the sanctioning country. The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") is the U.S. Department of the Treasury agency responsible for administrating and enforcing economic and trade sanctions.
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根據(jù)《布林克法案》，包括中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)在內(nèi)的任何外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)，一旦故意與一家受制裁的朝鮮實(shí)體進(jìn)行業(yè)務(wù)往來，將會被實(shí)際驅(qū)逐出美國金融系統(tǒng)，包括禁止在美國境內(nèi)開設(shè)、維持代理賬戶或過渡賬戶。
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Foreign financial institutions, including Chinese ones, that knowingly conduct a transaction with a sanctioned North Korean entity could be effectively barred from the U.S. financial system by the introduction of prohibitions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.
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《布林克法案》采用的是《2010年全面伊朗制裁、問責(zé)及撤資法》（下稱"《制裁伊朗法》"）的模式，即限制被制裁對象進(jìn)入全球金融市場。鑒于前述兩部法案內(nèi)容多有一致，我們認(rèn)為其執(zhí)行方式也大同小異。正如《制裁伊朗法》，美國也可以通過《布林克法案》實(shí)施域外管轄。關(guān)于美國域外管轄和長臂管轄，您可以瀏覽我們的近期文章《美國長臂管轄規(guī)則及其適用之解讀》。
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The BRINK Act is modeled on the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 ("CISADA"), a sanction law that aims to limit Iran’s access to the global financial markets.[4] Much of the language is the same, and we expect it will be enforced in the same manner. Like the CISADA, implementing the BRINK Act would be an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States. You can read our article on U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction here.
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一． 針對金融機(jī)構(gòu)的制裁
I.? Sanctions against Financial Institutions
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《布林克法案》中最關(guān)鍵的條款是，財政部長"應(yīng)對在本法案頒布90天或之后故意為受制裁的任何指定人員提供重要金融服務(wù)的外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)"實(shí)施"一項(xiàng)或多項(xiàng)制裁"。規(guī)定對前述"任何指定人員"進(jìn)行制裁的規(guī)范性文件包括：
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The key provision of the BRINK Act provides that the Secretary of the Treasury "shall impose one or more… sanctions" on "a foreign financial institution that the Secretary determines on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of the [BRINK Act] knowingly provides significant financial services to any person designated for the imposition of sanctions under" the following:
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1）《制裁朝鮮法》第104條（a）款或（b）款。該條列出了一系列美國政府應(yīng)當(dāng)實(shí)施制裁的活動，例如：故意向朝鮮出口大規(guī)模殺傷性武器相關(guān)技術(shù)；以及一系列美國政府可以視情況實(shí)施制裁的活動，例如：故意向根據(jù)聯(lián)合國安理會決議指定的受制裁實(shí)體提供金融服務(wù)。
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1) Section 104 (a) or (b) of the North Korea Sanctions Act. This section consists of a list of activities that warrant mandatory sanctions, e.g. knowingly exports technology for weapons of mass destruction to North Korea, and a list that allows for discretionary sanctions, e.g. knowingly provides financial services to any entity designated pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution.
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2）適用的行政命令。這包括13810號行政命令（追加針對朝鮮的制裁），13722號行政命令（封鎖朝鮮政府和朝鮮勞動黨的財產(chǎn)，禁止朝鮮相關(guān)的特定交易），13687號行政命令（追加針對朝鮮的制裁），13570號行政命令（禁止朝鮮相關(guān)的特定交易），13551號行政命令（封鎖朝鮮特定主體的財產(chǎn)），以及13466號行政命令（延續(xù)針對朝鮮和朝鮮國民的特定限制）。
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2) An applicable Executive order. This includes Executive Orders 13810 (Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea), 13722 (Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea), 13687 (Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea), 13570 (Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea), 13551 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea), and 13466 (Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals).
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3）適用的聯(lián)合國安理會決議。這包括聯(lián)合國2397號決議、2375號決議、2371號決議、2356號決議、2321號決議、2270號決議、2094號決議、2087號決議、1874號決議以及1718號決議。
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3) An applicable United Nations Security Council Resolution. This includes resolutions 2397, 2375, 2371, 2356, 2321, 2270, 2094, 2087, 1874, and 1718.
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前述《布林克法案》關(guān)鍵條款意味著，如果包括中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)在內(nèi)的外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)"故意"向前述法律、行政命令或者聯(lián)合國安理會決議"指定"實(shí)體提供"重要"金融服務(wù)，財政部長必須對該金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行制裁。這是《制裁朝鮮法》的升級版，因?yàn)椤吨撇贸r法》僅僅在前述重要金融服務(wù)"與制造、維護(hù)或者使用任何向朝鮮進(jìn)口、出口或再出口給朝鮮、進(jìn)入朝鮮或來自朝鮮的核武器、放射性武器、化學(xué)武器和生物武器，或者任何部分或全部設(shè)計用于發(fā)射這些武器的設(shè)備或者系統(tǒng)相關(guān)"時，才會施加制裁。
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This means that that Secretary of the Treasury must impose sanctions on Chinese financial institutions if the financial institution "knowingly" provides "significant" financial services to any entity "designated" by the aforementioned legislation, Executive orders, or UN Security Council Resolutions. This is an escalation of the North Korea Sanctions Act, which only required the imposition of mandatory sanctions if the significant financial services were "relat[ed] to the manufacture, maintenance, or use of any [nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapon or any device or system designed in whole or in part to deliver such a weapon] to be imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North Korea."
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二、 "故意"和"重要"的定義
II. Defining "knowingly" and "significant"
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前述條款的關(guān)鍵要件之一是金融機(jī)構(gòu)"故意"進(jìn)行法律禁止的行為?！恫剂挚朔ò浮范x了"故意"，即"在行為、某種情形或結(jié)果的語境下，‘故意’指某人知悉或者應(yīng)當(dāng)知悉該行為、情形或結(jié)果。"
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A key aspect of the aforementioned provisions is that a financial institution "knowingly" engages in the prohibited activity. The BRINK Act provides that "[t]he term ‘knowingly’, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result."
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雖然《布林克法案》未定義"重要"一詞，但作為《制裁朝鮮法》執(zhí)行細(xì)則的《制裁朝鮮規(guī)定》，對于一項(xiàng)交易是否"重要"列出了以下標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：
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交易的規(guī)模、數(shù)量、頻率和本質(zhì)；
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交易的類型、復(fù)雜性和商業(yè)目的；
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管理層對交易的關(guān)注程度，以及交易是否構(gòu)成行為模式的一部分；
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參與交易的外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)與朝鮮或被封鎖主體之間的聯(lián)系；
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交易對于13810號行政命令（追加針對朝鮮的制裁）之目標(biāo)的影響，包括授予或試圖授予朝鮮或被封鎖主體經(jīng)濟(jì)或者其他方面的利益；
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交易是否涉及任何欺詐行為；以及
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財政部根據(jù)個案分析認(rèn)為相關(guān)的其他因素。
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The term "significant" is not defined in the BRINK Act. However, in the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, which includes implementing regulations for the North Korea Sanctions Act, the criteria for determining whether a transaction is "significant" is as follows:
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the size, number, frequency, and nature of the transaction(s);
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type, complexity, and commercial purpose of the transaction(s);
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the level of awareness of management of the transaction(s) and whether the transaction(s) are a part of a pattern of conduct;
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the nexus between the foreign financial institution involved in the transaction(s) and North Korea or a blocked person;
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the impact of the transaction(s) on the goals of Executive Order?13810 (Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea), including the economic or other benefit conferred or attempted to be conferred on North Korea or a blocked person;
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whether the transaction(s) involved any deceptive practices; and
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other factors that the Department of the Treasury deems relevant on a case-by-case basis.
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三、違反《布林克法案》的
制裁和懲罰
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III. Sanctions and Penalties for Violations of the BRINK Act
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違反《布林克法案》的法律責(zé)任有兩種。首先，故意與前述受制裁主體進(jìn)行重要金融交易的金融機(jī)構(gòu)可能受到制裁。其次，違反前述《布林克法案》項(xiàng)下對金融機(jī)構(gòu)制裁的主體也會受到處罰。
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Punishments for violating the BRINK Act come in two forms. First, there are sanctions against financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant financial transactions with the aforementioned "designated" entities. Second, there are penalties for persons that violate sanctions imposed against financial institutions under the BRINK Act.
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具體而言，對于違反制裁規(guī)定的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，美國財政部長可以"封鎖并禁止所有在美國境內(nèi)、進(jìn)入美國境內(nèi)、為或?qū)槊绹黧w控制或持有之財產(chǎn)及財產(chǎn)權(quán)益相關(guān)的交易。"在某些情形下，財政部長也可以"禁止或通過附加嚴(yán)格的條件來約束該外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)在美國境內(nèi)開設(shè)、維持代理賬戶或過渡賬戶。"
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The Secretary of the Treasury may "block and prohibit . . . all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign financial institution if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person." Alternatively, the Treasury Secretary may "prohibit, or impose strict conditions on, the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial institution."
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財政部一般會通過頒布命令或者規(guī)定的方式來施加前述在美國境內(nèi)開設(shè)或維持代理賬戶的嚴(yán)格條件，并公布在聯(lián)邦公報上。財政部如果決定禁止某外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)開設(shè)或者維持美國代理賬戶或者過渡賬戶，會將其公布在"代理賬戶或者過渡賬戶受制裁外國金融機(jī)構(gòu)名單"上。
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If the Treasury Department decides to impose strict condition(s), the Treasury Department will issue an order or a regulation that sets out the strict condition(s) to be imposed on the U.S. correspondent accounts or U.S. payable-through accounts of the relevant foreign financial institution and publish the order or regulation in the Federal Register. If the Treasury Department decides to prohibit the opening or maintaining of U.S. correspondent accounts or U.S. payable-through accounts for a foreign financial institution, the Treasury Department will add the name of the foreign financial institution and publish it on its List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (the "CAPTA List").[5]
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此外，任何違反前述《布林克法案》項(xiàng)下對金融機(jī)構(gòu)制裁的主體，都會面臨《國際緊急經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力法》第206節(jié)所列處罰，包括數(shù)額不超過25萬美元或"違規(guī)交易標(biāo)的額兩倍"孰高者的罰款，故意違反制裁更可能招致高達(dá)100萬美金的罰金和/或長達(dá)20年的有期徒刑。
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Persons who violate sanctions imposed against financial institutions under the BRINK Act would be subject to penalties under Section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This includes civil penalty no greater than $250,000 or "an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed." Willful violations may result in a criminal penalty of up to $1,000,000, or a prison sentence of up to 20 years, or both.
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對中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)的建議
Observations for Chinese Financial Institutions
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雖然監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)過往對制裁違反美國法律的外國大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)存在猶豫，《布林克法案》的強(qiáng)制性還是會使其采取可能對中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)造成嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的執(zhí)法措施。因?yàn)橹撇煤蛻土P在《布林克法案》頒布90天后就開始執(zhí)行，如果金融機(jī)構(gòu)等到法律出臺以后再建立、完善自身合規(guī)體系，或者進(jìn)行必要的審計來篩查被制裁客戶，那么時間會非常緊張。
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Although there has been some reluctance in the past to sanction large financial institutions, Chinese or otherwise, for violating U.S. sanctions, the mandatory nature of the BRINK Act would force the U.S. administration to take action that could cause significant harm to Chinese financial institutions. Since the sanctions and penalties would kick in within 90 days of the BRINK Act being passed into law, waiting for the legislative process may leave financial institutions too little time to implement a robust sanction compliance program and conduct the necessary audits to ensure that no existing customers are designated entities.
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特別是，《布林克法案》中"應(yīng)當(dāng)知悉"這一主觀要件衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，使得中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)更應(yīng)立即建立或完善制裁合規(guī)體系。盡管《布林克法案》尚未正式出臺，時間的緊迫性和后果的嚴(yán)重性使得中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)有必要迅速采取行動。
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Especially, the "should have known" standard in the BRINK act, may push the Chinese financial institutions to establish compliance program. Although it is unclear whether the amendment containing the BRINK Act will make it through the U.S. legislative process, the short timelines and massive impact it could have on Chinese financial institutions necessitates swift action.
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鑒于此，我們建議中國金融機(jī)構(gòu)聘請具備制裁合規(guī)體系建設(shè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的律師團(tuán)隊(duì)，以建立符合OFAC標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的制裁合規(guī)體系。您可以瀏覽我們近期關(guān)于OFAC制裁合規(guī)指南的文章《中國企業(yè)如何防范和應(yīng)對美國政府制裁風(fēng)險？——美國財政部
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As such, we highly recommend that Chinese financial institutions engage external sanction compliance experts with experience implementing sanction compliance programs that meet OFAC standards. You can read our article on the recently published OFAC Framework that serve as a guideline for robust U.S. sanction compliance program here.
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[注]
[1]https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-116s1790es/pdf/BILLS-116s1790es.pdf
[2]"New North Korea sanctions would tell Chinese banks: It’s us or them," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/new-north-korea-sanctions-would-tell-chinese-banks-its-us-or-them.
[3]https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/114publ122.pdf
[4]31 C.F.R. 561
[5]The CAPTA list can be found here https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/capta_list.aspx
